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An Empirical Look at the “Brokered”
Market for Patents
Brian J. Love*
Kent Richardson**
Erik Oliver***
Michael Costa****

ABSTRACT
We study five years of data on patents listed and sold in the quasi-public
“brokered” market. Our data covers almost 39,000 assets, an estimated eighty
percent of all patents and applications offered for sale by patent brokers between 2012 and 2016. We provide statistics on the size and composition of the
brokered market, including the types of buyers and sellers who participate in
the market, the types of patents listed and sold on the market, and how market
conditions have changed over time. We conclude with an analysis of what our
data can tell us about how to accurately value technology, the costs and benefits of patent monetization, and the brokered market’s ability to measure the
impact of changes to patent law.

I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars, attorneys, and business professionals have long bemoaned the
lack of available data on the market for patent transactions.1 While resources
exist to value cars, real estate, coins, comic books, and myriad other goods and
services, no equivalent exists for patent rights.2 Despite producing billions of
*
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and Unified Patents.
1. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 257–59 (2007) (describing problems created by the “blind
market” for patents and proposing mandatory publication of patent license and sale
terms as a solution); Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 116–17 (2011) (“[B]oth scholars and practitioners are seeking ways to improve how patents are valued, with scholars often calling for greater disclosure of sale
terms to aid in setting market prices and practitioners focusing on refining methods for
predicting a patent’s value to their own clients.”).
2. See, e.g., KELLEY BLUE BOOK, https://www.kbb.com/car-values/ (last visited
May 22, 2018) (listing price estimates for used cars); REDFIN, https://www.redfin.com/
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dollars in annual revenues worldwide,3 the market for licensing and buying
patent rights operates in near total darkness. Virtually all deals are negotiated
in secret and thereafter come to light only rarely.4 As a result, potential buyers
and sellers often have a hard time locating one another and, when they do, often
cannot agree on the appropriate methodology for determining a price, let alone
what that price should be.5
(last visited May 22, 2018) (listing price estimates for residential real estate); Coin
Price Guides, COINWEEK, http://www.coinweek.com/coin-prices/coin-price-guides/
(last visited May 22, 2018) (listing more than twenty publications and websites that
estimate market prices for collectable coins); Comic Book Price Guide, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comic_book_price_guide (last visited May 22, 2018)
(listing more than ten publications and websites that estimate market prices for comic
books).
3. See Federico Caviggioli & Elisa Ughetto, The Drivers of Patent Transactions:
Corporate Views on the Market for Patents, 43 R&D MGMT. 318, 319 (2013) (collecting estimates that place annual, worldwide revenue from patent transactions as high as
$100 billion in 2003). But see Ashish Arora et al., Markets for Technology in the
Knowledge Economy, 54 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 115, 118 (2002) (estimating that the global
market for all technology licensing is between $30 and $50 billion annually); Kelley,
supra note 1, at 115 (reporting that the worldwide market for technology licensing “approached or exceeded $90 billion per year since 2003”). Recent years have seen multiple public portfolio sales in the nine- to ten-figure range. See, e.g., Andrew Martin,
Kodak to Sell Digital Imaging Patents for $525 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/business/kodak-to-sell-patents-for-525-million.html; Peg Brickley, Nortel $4.5-Billion Patent Sale to Apple, Microsoft, Others
Approved, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2011, 3:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812104576440161959082234; Zack Whittaker, Chip Designer MIPS Acquired for $60m; Patents Sold for $350m, ZDNET (Nov. 6, 2012,
10:53), http://www.zdnet.com/article/chip-designer-mips-acquired-for-60m-patentssold-for-350m/.
4. See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 1, at 257 (noting that “[e]ven if [a] patent
or ones like it have been licensed dozens of times before, the terms of those licenses,
including the price itself, will almost invariably be confidential”); Kelley, supra note
1, at 130 n.82 (noting that “[t]he vast majority of IP licenses and technology sales occur
on confidential bases” and that “confidentiality is often highly negotiated between the
parties”). In our experience, parties to a patent transaction opt for confidentiality
largely due to uncertainty about how the market and their competitors will interpret the
sale. Nonetheless, some licenses and sales become public when, for example, securities
regulations require their disclosure. See infra note 15. Others are occasionally admitted into evidence in patent suits. See Tejas N. Narechania & Jackson Taylor Kirklin,
An Unsettling Development: The Use of Settlement-Related Evidence for Damages Determinations in Patent Litigation, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 19–25 (collecting
court orders discussing the discoverability and admissibility of patent licenses).
5. Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms,
Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 45–46 (2013)
(“[P]atent buyers and sellers frequently have a hard time finding each other . . . . and
when buyers and sellers do find each other they usually negotiate under enormous
uncertainty: prices of similar patents vary widely from transaction to transaction and
the terms of the transactions (including prices) are often secret and confidential.”);
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In addition to throwing sand in the gears of the market for patent rights,
this lack of transparency contributes indirectly to many of the patent system’s
gravest ills. Many worry, for example, that damages awarded in litigation lack
a meaningful connection to the real world value of patented technology, in part
because so much of the market is unobservable.6 A lack of reliable pricing
information also opens the door for arbitrage, a factor contributing to the rise
of “patent assertion entities” (“PAEs”) – patent monetization specialists that
are uniquely able to wield various forms of “holdup” power over the parties
they sue in order to extract settlements that reflect more than the value of the
asserted patent.7 Conversely, the costs inherent in participating in an inefficient market contribute to the fact that many tech companies choose to turn a

Caviggioli & Ughetto, supra note 3, at 326 (finding, in a survey of corporate parties
involved in patent transactions, that “[w]hen asked to rate the major obstacles hampering the growth of these marketplaces, our respondents identify the most relevant factors
as information asymmetries and lack of shared methods to assess the economic value
of patents”).
6. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW.
U. L. REV. 115, 121 (2015) (arguing that the process of awarding patent damages based
on prior comparable settlements is “ineluctably circular”); Lemley & Myhrvold, supra
note 1, at 257 (explaining that because the patent market lacks transparency “courts
lack adequate benchmarks to determine a ‘reasonable royalty’ when companies infringe
patents”).
7. See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 5, at 51 (“In essence, nonpracticing entities
act as arbitrageurs, first acquiring patents, typically from individual inventors or small
companies, and then seeking licensing revenues from operating companies through litigation . . . .”). The term “patent assertion entity” is typically defined to encompass all
non-practicing patent enforcers, except universities, early stage startups, and IP holding
subsidiaries of operating technology companies. See Informational Hearing on Patent
Assertion Entities Before the California Assembly Select Committee on High Technology (Oct. 30, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.?abstract_id=2347138
(statement of Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara Univ.). Because
PAEs do not compete with the companies that they sue, they are able to take advantage
of several holdup opportunities that are generally not available to operating companies.
For example, because PAEs do not sell products that compete with those produced by
alleged infringers, they are able to avoid countersuit and thus can generally leverage
asymmetric litigation costs against the parties they sue. See id. In addition, because
PAEs sue to recover monetary damages rather than injunctions to protect market share,
they can strategically delay suit until alleged infringers are “locked in” to using the
allegedly infringing technology and, thus, cannot easily switch to a non-infringing alternative. See Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) (“By pursuing a patent license ex post, after a product
has been created, rather than ex ante, at the time the product is being designed, the
patent owner can leverage not only the economic value of the invention, but also the
cost of changing the product.”).
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blind eye to the market entirely, a practice decried by many patentees as “holdout” behavior designed to raise the cost of patent enforcement.8 These concerns – each among the most debated patent law issues of the last quarter century – would see significant improvement in a world with a transparent market
for patent rights. However, information about patent transactions has to date
proven hard to collect and interpret.
Currently available information about the patent marketplace is largely
anecdotal and qualitative in nature. Scholars have studied market conditions
primarily by interviewing market participants9 or conducting case studies of
firms known to be active in the market.10 Though a few studies have collected
quantitative data on transactions, such studies generally suffer from methodological limitations that make their findings hard to generalize. For example,
while several scholars have sought to study patent transactions by collecting
patent reassignment information disclosed to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”),11 these studies are limited by, among other confounding factors, the fact that patent reassignments are voluntarily disclosed, that patent
reassignments often reflect corporate mergers or name changes rather than actual sales, and that PTO records lack any information about the price paid for
the patent.12 Other scholars have attempted to overcome these hurdles by accessing data on actual transactions, but again their studies paint at best a partial,
8. See Chien, supra note 7, at 20 (defining patent hold-out as “the practice of
companies ignoring patents and patent demands because the high costs of enforcing
patents make[] prosecution unlikely”).
9. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 117 (presenting “a current view of the patent marketplace from a practitioner’s perspective”); Ashby H. B. Monk, The Emerging Market
for Intellectual Property: Drivers, Restrainers, and Implications, 9 J. ECON.
GEOGRAPHY 469, 471 (2009) (presenting an analysis based on “numerous elite interviews with corporate executives, corporate IP lawyers, patent intermediaries and IP
industry groups in Boston, Seattle and Silicon Valley”).
10. See Gary Dushnitsky & Thomas Klueter, Is There an eBay for Ideas? Insights
from Online Knowledge Marketplaces, 8 EURO. MGMT. REV. 17 (2011) (studying thirty
online IP marketplaces).
11. See Colleen V. Chien, Software Patents as a Currency, Not Tax, on Innovation, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1669, 1678 (2016) (analyzing software patent transfers
between 2012 and 2015); Alberto Galasso et al., Trading and Enforcing Patent Rights,
44 RAND J. ECON. 275, 277 (2013) (analyzing patent transfers from individual inventors
between 1983 and 2000); Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal
of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON. 686, 690 (2010) (analyzing PTO reassignment data from
1980 to 2001). For similar studies analyzing transfers of non-U.S. patents, see HENRY
CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: US
AND JAPAN COMPARISONS 3–4 (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.inpit.go.jp/blob/katsuyo/pdf/download/H17esm-e.pdf (comparing patent reassignment data from the
United States and Japan); FABIAN GAESSLER & DIETMAR HARHOFF, PATENT
TRANSFERS IN EUROPE: DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL REPORT (Sept. 4, 2016) (on file
with authors).
12. See Serrano, supra note 11, at 691 (explaining that many recorded assignments
do not represent “transaction[s] of patents across firm boundaries” and instead result
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skewed picture of the market. While a handful of studies have collected data
on patent transactions disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”)13 or patent auctions conducted by Ocean Tomo,14 it is well known that
these deals represent only the tip of the iceberg and, moreover, are far from
representative of the broader market.15
In this Article, we take advantage of Richardson Oliver Law Group’s
(“ROL Group”) unique position as an active participant in the patent marketplace to present what we believe to be the largest and most representative empirical study of the secondary market for patent rights. Our data spans five
years of transactions, involving almost 39,000 patent assets, an estimated
eighty percent of all patents offered for sale on the quasi-public “brokered”
market during the period of our study.16 For the first time, we provide nearcomprehensive statistics on the size and composition of the brokered market,
including the types of buyers and sellers who participate in the market, the
types of patents listed and sold on the market, and how market conditions have
changed over time. Our findings have importance for ongoing debates about
how best to value patent rights, how to quantify the costs and benefits of patent
monetization, and what impact recent changes to patent law have on companies
with patent portfolios.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on the secondary market for patents, including the types of entities that participate in the
market. Part III explains our data collection methodology. Part IV provides
descriptive statistics that summarize what we observe in the data, and, finally,
Part V discusses what our data can tell us about the patent system.

from “administrative events, such as a name change, a security interest, a correction,
and so on” or “transactions between inventors-employers and their employees-assignees”).
13. Chien, supra note 11, at 1697 (studying 1431 software-related patent transactions disclosed to the SEC that were sourced from ktMine); Thomas R. Varner, An
Economic Perspective on Patent Licensing Structure and Provisions, 46 BUS. ECON.
229, 231 (2011) (studying 1458 patent licenses and transfers disclosed to the SEC).
14. Cristina Odasso et al., Selling Patents at Auction: An Empirical Analysis of
Patent Value, 24 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 417, 424–25 (2015) (studying 535 lots auctioned by Ocean Tomo between 2006 and 2008); Katherine A. Sneed & Daniel K. N.
Johnson, Selling Ideas: The Determinants of Patent Value in an Auction Environment,
39 R&D MGMT. 87, 89 (2009) (studying 121 Ocean Tomo lots resulting in fifty-one
sales).
15. Transactions disclosed to the SEC, in particular, are especially large because
regulations require the disclosure of only those deals that are “material” to the finances
of a publicly traded company. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K, CURRENT
REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (requiring in Item 1.01 the disclosure of “material definitive agreement[s] not made in the ordinary course of business”)
(last visited May 22, 2018).
16. As we discuss infra in Part III, our coverage is higher for recent years and
lower for earlier years.
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II. THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR PATENTS
Conceptually, the market for patent rights can be divided into deals that
license the right to use patented inventions and deals that lead to the outright
sale of one or more patents.17 The market for patent sales can, in turn, be further subdivided into two market segments: first, a quasi-public “brokered” market of packages that are shopped to multiple potential buyers and, second, a
private market of transfers that are negotiated in secret between specific parties.18 Figure 1 provides a simple depiction of these market divisions.
The first “brokered” market segment consists of patent packages that are
offered widely to prospective buyers and thus are generally observable to interested market participants, though typically subject to confidentiality agreements that render the market unobservable to the public at large.19 Almost
without exception, patents offered for sale in this quasi-public market are
shopped by patent “brokers,”20 and for this reason we refer to it as the “brokered market.” Brokers are, in effect, the intellectual property equivalent of
real estate agents. They market patents on sellers’ behalf in an attempt to find
and negotiate deals with potential buyers,21 and in return, they take a fee of
roughly twenty percent of deals that they close.22

17. In reality, of course, many deals include both licenses and sales. However, as
explained in greater detail infra in Part IV.A, the quasi-public brokered market that we
study in this paper is almost entirely limited to pure patent sales. PTO assignment
records suggest that roughly fourteen percent of patents change hands at least once
before they expire. See Serrano, supra note 11, at 693 (reporting that, across technologies, transfer rates vary between roughly twelve and sixteen percent).
18. Kent Richardson, Erik Oliver & Michael Costa, Inside the 2016 Brokered Patent Market, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Jan./Feb. 2017, at 34.
19. Kelley, supra note 1, at 135–36. In addition to hurdles caused by confidentiality obligations, even seasoned market insiders will invariably miss some portion of
this market due to the dispersed and sometimes haphazard nature in which packages
are circulated for sale by some brokers and sellers. Id.
20. In the data that we describe infra, more than ninety-eight percent of the packages that we observe were marketed through brokers. Fewer than two percent of patents
were, to borrow a phrase from the real estate market, “for sale by owner.” See also
Richardson, Oliver & Costa, supra note 18, at 36 (reporting that at least seventy-three
brokers represented patent sellers in 2016). But see Kelley, supra note 1, at 121 (reporting that “[b]rokers facilitate three-quarters of the sales in the patent marketplace”).
21. In our experience, brokers often perform tasks such as selecting which patent
assets to sell, setting asking prices, identifying potential infringement, identifying and
contacting potential buyers, and establishing a procedure for prospective buyers’ diligence and bidding. Richardson, Oliver & Costa, supra note 18, at 35.
22. See Kent Richardson & Erik Oliver, Turning the Spotlight on the Brokered
Patent Market, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Jan./Feb. 2013, at 11, 16 (reporting an average
commission rate of twenty-two percent); Kelley, supra note 1, at 121 (reporting that
broker commissions range between ten and twenty-five percent).
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Figure 1: The Market for Patent Transactions23

Patent purchases that take place outside the brokered market are both
harder to observe and harder to categorize. Anecdotally, sales in this “private”
market tend to be relatively large deals negotiated directly between buyers and
sellers, often without the assistance of brokers. In our experience, private sales
are more idiosyncratic in nature and frequently are motivated by a broader set
of considerations that extend beyond the transferred patents. Consider for example one deal that became public in 2014. That year, Twitter purchased 900
patents from IBM in a $36 million deal. However, the parties’ agreement followed a threat from IBM to file suit against Twitter shortly before its initial
public offering, and the deal included cross-licensing terms in addition to the
transfer of patents.24
Buyers, like sellers, also participate in the patent marketplace both indirectly through third parties and directly without representation. For buyers,
however, the division is not nearly so stark across market segments. In both
the private and quasi-public markets, buyers are often indirectly represented by
patent “aggregators,” entities that are frequent purchasers and generally exist

23. This Figure is not intended to depict the relative sizes of each market subset,
only their relationship to one another.
24. See, e.g., Klint Finley, Twitter Pays $36 Million to Avoid IBM Patent Suit,
WIRED (Mar. 7, 2014, 2:42 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/twitter-ibm/.
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to facilitate coordination among multiple buyers with similar interests.25 “Defensive” aggregators like Allied Security Trust and RPX use a membership feebased model to accumulate funds that can be used to purchase patents of interest to their members.26 Generally, these patents fall into one of three categories: (i) patents currently being enforced against members, (ii) patents that
members fear may be asserted against them in court down the road, or (iii)
patents that members wish to hold for possible defensive use against competitors. That said, some entities that have been categorized as aggregators do buy
with monetization in mind and thus are generally also considered PAEs.27 Intellectual Ventures (“IV”), which owns upwards of 38,000 patents and applications,28 is undoubtedly the most famous example. Though largely funded by
operating technology companies like Microsoft, Intel, and Sony,29 IV’s business model goes well beyond defensive acquisition. In fact, it is generally understood that IV earns the “vast majority” of its revenue from licensing its portfolio.30
Despite the large sums of money at stake and the sophistication of many
buyers and sellers, there remains no central clearinghouse for patent offerings.
However, several third-party platforms play an important and increasingly
common role in bringing potential buyers and sellers together. For example,
auction houses like Ocean Tomo exist to facilitate the sale of patents to the
highest bidder.31 In addition, online platforms have arisen in an attempt to
25. See generally Sell Your Patent, RPX, https://www.rpxcorp.com/rpx-sell-yourpatent/ (last visited May 22, 2018).
26. Company, RPX, https://www.rpxcorp.com/about-rpx/ (last visited May 22,
2018) (“By acquiring problem patents, RPX helps to mitigate and manage the risk of
potential patent assertions for its growing client network.”); About Us, ALLIED
SECURITY TRUST, http://www.ast.com/about-us/asts-mission/ (last visited May 22,
2018) (“We are an independent member-based, not-for-profit cooperative that helps
companies who use innovative technologies mitigate the risk of patent assertions and
litigation by securing rights from patents available on the open market.”).
27. See, e.g., Erik Oliver, Kent Richardson & Michael Costa, How Intellectual
Ventures Is Streamlining Its Portfolio, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., May/June 2016, at 9.
28. Id. at 10 (reporting that IV’s monetization funds collectively include 38,700
patents); Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2012) (reporting in 2012 that IV “has accumulated 30,000–60,000 patents
worldwide, which would make it the 5th largest patent portfolio of any domestic US
company and the 15th largest of any company in the world”).
29. See Oliver, Richardson & Costa, supra note 27, at 9 (“Since its founding, it
has reportedly raised over $6 billion in capital. A large portion of this has come from
corporate investors in the high-tech space, such as Microsoft, Intel, Sony, Nokia, Apple,
Google, Yahoo, American Express, Adobe, SAP, NVIDIA and eBay.”).
30. See id. (“The vast majority of IV’s revenue does not come from making products or offering services. Rather, it comes from licensing its portfolio to other companies – IV is the quintessential NPE.”).
31. See Intellectual Property Auctions, OCEAN TOMO, http://www.oceantomo.com/intellectual-property-auctions/ (last visited May 22, 2018) (explaining that
the company conducts both “private” and “live” auctions). Though auctions are far less
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connect buyers and sellers.32 While some have failed,33 others like the new
IAM Market34 have become quite successful. Today, an estimated twenty-five
percent of patents offered for sale by brokers are listed by IAM,35 and we anticipate that participation in online marketplaces will continue to grow in the
coming years.

III. METHODOLOGY
To learn more about the market for patents, we set out to identify as many
patents as possible that were offered for sale on the brokered market between
January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2016. To identify packages, we collected
data from brokers as well as from online platforms. To collect data from brokers, we constructed and updated a list of known brokers and negotiated with
each to obtain data on the patents that they offered during the period of our
study.36 In all, we were able to obtain data covering at least some portion of
our study period from more than 100 brokers and sellers.37 We also supplemented this data with listings posted to online platforms, primarily IAM Market, to identify as many additional packages as possible.
Though this collection procedure is imperfect, we believe that our sample
is the most comprehensive studied to date.38 To estimate the percent of the
brokered market that our data covers, we benchmarked our data against internal
common today, at least one study estimated that about ten percent of transferred patents
were sold via auction. See Kelley, supra note 1, at 122 (reporting that “[t]en percent of
the patents sold are currently sold through auctions”).
32. Prior to the rise of the Internet, third party publications also helped patent
sellers spread the word about their inventions. For example, the NEW PRODUCT
NEWSLETTER was published from 1954 to 1997. See, e.g., 37 INT’L NEW PRODUCT
NEWSLETTER (Transcommunications Int’l Inc., Marblehead, Mass.), Jan. 1991, at 1 (on
file with authors).
33. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, FRAND Market Failure: IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent License Exchange, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 419 (2016) (describing
the business model, launch, and subsequent failure of the Intellectual Property Exchange International, Inc. (“IPXI”)).
34. IAM MARKET, https://www.iam-market.com/ (last visited May 22, 2018).
35. See Richardson, Oliver & Costa, supra note 18, at 34 (reporting that between
October 2015 and May 2016 the IAM Market “listed 194 packages, with 3,724 assets,
from 17 sellers”).
36. In each case, we were allowed access only under non-disclosure agreement
(“NDA”), and thus unfortunately our raw data cannot be made publicly available. We
were successful in obtaining this data primarily because ROL Group frequently represents buyers in patent deals and, thus, brokers have a strong incentive to ensure that
ROL Group is aware of new packages when they hit the market. Patent Brokers,
RICHARDSON OLIVER L. GROUP, http://www.richardsonoliver.com/brokers/ (last visited
May 22, 2018).
37. A current list of active brokers is available online here: http://www.richardsonoliver.com/brokers.
38. For a summary of additional limitations to our data, see infra Part IV.
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datasets maintained by multiple entities that operate large patent buying programs.39 Based on these benchmark comparisons, we estimate that we were
able to observe approximately fifty-five percent of all patents placed on the
brokered market in 2012, approximately sixty-five percent of such patents in
2013, and approximately ninety-five percent of the brokered market in 2014,
2015, and 2016.40
We elected to limit our data collection to the brokered market and, thus,
our database does not include any “private” transactions. We did so for two
reasons. First, private transactions are rarely observable, and when they are, it
is typically because they have been disclosed to the SEC. As discussed supra,
transactions disclosed to the SEC tend to be unusually large relative to the size
of the disclosing party.41 In the context of private patent sales, we would expect
the data to be biased even more so because private deals are disproportionately
transacted between large parties, such as publicly traded technology companies
and large aggregators. Second, in our experience, prices in private transactions
are typically based on information gleaned from the quasi-public brokered market. Because private transactions tend to be unusually large and heterogeneous,
parties to those transactions are generally unable to use other private deals to
conduct price comparisons. Thus, it is our experience that the brokered market
informs the price of patents in private transactions, but not vice versa.42
We collected a variety of information about each package that we identified. First, we made note of the specific assets43 included in the packages,
including their quantity, technology classes, and (for U.S. assets) the PTO “art
unit” in which they were examined.44 In addition, we hand coded each package
39. Unfortunately, we were only allowed to compare our respective data for the
purposes of estimating coverage; we were not permitted to access any missing data. In
addition, we have agreed not to disclose the names of the entities that assisted us in
performing this benchmark.
40. In the latter half of 2013, we substantially expanded our data collection efforts,
both by increasing the number of brokers from which we collected data and by increasing the number of packages we were able to review from each broker. We believe that
our data for 2012 and 2013 is reasonably representative of the overall brokered market
during those years despite constituting a much smaller sample than we were able to
obtain in later years. As reported infra Part IV, we find a quite consistent distribution
of package sizes, types of buyers, and patented technologies across all five years of our
data.
41. See supra note 15.
42. Nonetheless, we are cognizant of the fact that private transactions constitute a
large percentage, and likely the majority, of the total market for patent sales. Extrapolating from overall PTO assignment data, we believe it is reasonable to assume that the
private market is roughly ten times larger than the brokered market. However, in the
technology categories that dominate our data – computer hardware, software, and telecommunications – we estimate that about twenty to twenty-five percent of all transferred patents are sold on the brokered market.
43. “Assets” includes both issued patents and pending applications.
44. U.S. patent examiners are divided into nine “technology centers,” each of
which is subdivided into a number of “work units” that, in turn, are further subdivided

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/7

10

Love et al.: An Empirical Look at the "Brokered" Market for Patents

2018]

THE "BROKERED" MARKET FOR PATENTS

369

as relating to one of four broad technology categories: software, hardware,
communications, or “other.” As discussed in greater detail below, the packages
that we observed overwhelmingly related to computer or telecommunications
technology.45 We also noted whether each package was circulated to potential
buyers along with “evidence of use” (“EOU”) documentation, i.e., a document
(sometimes in the form of a claim chart) explaining that one or more assets in
the package may be infringed. When an EOU was provided, we additionally
noted the company, product, and/or technology standard that was implicated.
When available, we also noted the asking price for the package provided
by the seller’s broker. As shown below in Table 2, roughly seventy-seven percent of the packages that we observed were offered with some form of pricing
guidance. While some packages did include exact asking prices, it was more
common for packages to indicate an anticipated range of value. When specific
asking prices were not provided, we estimated the asking price as the midpoint
of the range.46
In addition to collecting data on each package, we also identified the entity attempting to sell the patent, i.e., the broker’s client. We further classified
each seller as an individual inventor, PAE, operating technology company, defensive aggregator, or university or other research institution. For classification purposes, we defined a PAE as a non-practicing, for-profit entity that earns
the majority of its revenue from patent licensing. For operating companies, we
additionally noted whether the company was publicly traded or privately held.
Next, we determined to the best of our ability whether each offered package was ultimately sold. To determine which packages sold, we searched PTO
assignment data for all U.S. patent assets that were placed on the market.47 If
a U.S. patent that was offered for sale was subsequently reassigned to a new
owner,48 we assumed that the asset was successfully sold along with all other
assets in its package.49 We conducted this search in July 2017 and made note

into “art units.” See Patent Technology Centers Management, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/patent-technologycenters-management (last visited May 22, 2018).
45. See infra Part IV.C.
46. Approximately two percent of packages were listed with pricing information
that we viewed as too vague to assign a specific number. We treat these packages as if
they were provided without pricing information.
47. PTO assignment data is public and can be searched online. Patent Assignment
Search, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://assignment.uspto.gov/patent/index.html#/patent/search (last visited May 22, 2018).
48. We scrutinized the assignments to exclude those that merely represent name
changes or mergers.
49. In our experience, it is extremely rare for packages to sell in pieces. Rather
they virtually always sell as a whole, or do not sell at all. Nonetheless, it is possible
that this methodology somewhat overstates the per asset sales rate.
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of all assignments dated on or before December 31, 2016.50 For two reasons
our sales data likely understates the rate of sale. First, patent assignments are
voluntary and, thus, some sales may not have been recorded.51 Second, packages often sit on the market for months before they are sold and, thus, some
packages placed on the market likely sold (or will sell) in 2017 or thereafter.52
For packages that we identified as sold, we additionally identified the
buyer. As with sellers, we categorized each buyer as a PAE, operating company (public or private), defensive aggregator, individual, or university. Finally, we determined whether any U.S. patent assets included in sold packages
were subsequently litigated in district court or challenged before the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). For those that we identified as asserted or
challenged, we noted the date of the suit or challenge, as well as the parties
named in the suit. Our data on assertions and challenges is current through
September 2017.53 As with sales, assertions often occur months after patents
change hands. Thus, our assertion data likely understates the true rate of litigation and administrative challenge, particularly for patents placed on the market in 2015 and 2016.54

IV. FINDINGS
In this Part, we summarize our observations. First, we present statistics
on the overall market, including the number and sizes of packages placed on
the market, the asking prices for packages on offer, the rate at which packages
sold, and the impact that package size and documentation had on sales. Next,
we break the data down according to the types of entities involved in transactions. We take an especially close look at transactions involving privately held
50. Thus, our data does not include any sales that actually occurred in 2017. We
conducted the search in mid-2017 because sales are often recorded with the PTO weeks
or months after they take place.
51. We believe that, while this is possible, it is likely a very rare occurrence. Buyers in the brokered market are mostly large, sophisticated businesses with very low risk
tolerances.
52. As shown below in Figure 3, only about seventy-five percent of packages are
sold within one year of their initial listing. There are two other less important reasons
that this methodology may further understate the rate of sale: some packages may have
resulted in a partial sale that did not include a U.S. asset, and a small number of observed packages did not include any U.S. assets. In our experience, the former is highly
unlikely. While it is common for prices to reflect a small number of assets among the
many included in a package, packages virtually always sell as a whole. With respect
to the latter, fewer than four percent of observed packages did not include at least one
issued U.S. patent.
53. We collected litigation and PTAB data by searching Docket Navigator for each
sold U.S. patent. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, https://www.docketnavigator.com (last visited May 22, 2018).
54. As shown below in Table 9, packages that were litigated were, on average,
enforced in court about 187 days after they were purchased.
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operating companies, PAEs, and universities. Finally, we present statistics on
transactions across technologies and take a closer look at the market for certain
types of patents, including those claiming business methods.

A. Overall Market Statistics
We begin with an overview of all observed packages that were offered
for sale between 2012 and 2016. Table 1 below presents data on the quantity
and sizes of these packages.
Table 1: Overall Number of Packages and Assets Observed

Year

2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Total

Num.
Packages
Observed
(Est.
Total55)

Num.
Patent
Assets
Observed
(Est.
Total)

199
(362)
377
(580)
657
(692)
709
(746)
663
(698)
2,605
(3,078)

3,761
(6,838)
5,583
(8,589)
9,999
(10,525)
8,432
(8,876)
11,218
(11,808)
38,993
(46,636)

Num.
Issued
U.S.
Patents
Observed
(Est.
Total)
1,809
(3,289)
3,545
(5,453)
6,923
(7,287)
5,381
(5,664)
6,242
(6,570)
23,900
(28,263)

Avg.
(Median)
Total Assets/Package

Avg.
(Median)
Issued
U.S. Patents/Pac
kage

18.9
(5)
14.8
(4)
15.2
(5)
11.9
(5)
16.9
(6)
15.0
(5)

9.1
(3)
9.4
(2)
10.7
(3)
7.6
(3)
9.5
(3)
9.2
(3)

First, we find that asset packages are almost without exception made up
exclusively of issued patents and pending patent applications. Less than one
percent of the packages that we observed included another type of IP right or
some form of know-how. Those rare packages that did include non-patent assets overwhelmingly listed a trademark (thirteen of seventeen packages).

55. Our estimated totals assume that we observed fifty-five percent of the total
brokered market in 2012, sixty-five percent in 2013, and ninety-five percent in 2014,
2015, and 2016. As discussed supra at notes 39–40, these coverage estimates are derived from comparing our data with data accumulated by other large market participants.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7

372

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

Three or fewer packages offered to transfer source code, a domain name, or
some form of trade secret, like a customer list.56
On average, the packages we observed also consist primarily of issued
U.S. patents. This is not surprising because, in our experience, it is usually
U.S. patent assets that drive sales.57 The United States is one of the largest
technology markets in the world,58 as well as one of the most litigious,59 and
both of these facts tend to increase the importance and value of U.S. patent
rights. In our experience, buyers are also attracted to U.S. patents due to the
availability of important information about them. Compared to patent offices
in other parts of the world, the PTO makes a relatively large amount of data
available to the public.60 As a result, it is easier for buyers to perform due
56. Feldman and Lemley make a similar finding in a study of licensing offers made
by patentees to technology companies. See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do
Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 153, 158 (2015)
(finding that respondents in a survey of in-house counsel at technology companies overwhelmingly reported that patentee-initiated licenses led to the transfer of “[t]echnical
[k]nowledge in addition to the [p]atent [l]icense” between “0-10%” whether or not the
patentee was an NPE, university, or operating technology company). On the other
hand, studies of patent transactions reported to the SEC have consistently found that at
least some transactions include other IP assets or know-how. See Varner, supra note
13, at 232 (finding in a study of more than 1400 patent transactions reported to the SEC
that fifty-six percent included know-how in addition to the license or sale).
57. This, of course, is not always true. For example, German patents are also
highly sought after by many buyers, likely due to the jurisdiction’s high grant rate for
injunctions and bifurcation of infringement and validity determinations. See Katrin
Cremers et al., Invalid but Infringed? An Analysis of the Bifurcated Patent Litigation
System, 131 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 218, 219 (2016).
58. For example, on a per capita basis, a patentee would have to obtain and enforce
patent rights in at least five European countries to match the jurisdictional reach of one
patent suit in the United States. See, e.g., Population, Total, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL (last visited May 22, 2018) (showing that the U.S. population is roughly 323 million, approximately equal to that of
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom combined).
59. Compared to the United States, which has seen more than 4000 patent suits
filed each year since 2012, Cases Filed by Year, LEX MACHINA, https://law.lexmachina.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018), other nations see relatively few suits, see Brian J.
Love et al., Patent Assertion Entities in Europe, in PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES AND
COMPETITION POLICY 104, 107 (D. Daniel Sokol ed., 2017) (reporting that there were
less than 100 patent suits filed in the United Kingdom in twelve out of fourteen years
during the period 2000–2013, and that there were less than 600 patent suits filed in
Germany in eight out of nine years during the period 2000–2008).
60. In addition to existing databases like Pubic Patent Application Information
Retrieval (“PAIR”), Patent Application Information Retrieval, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (last visited May 22, 2018),
the USPTO recently released multiple relational databases of U.S. patent-related data
for free, bulk download by the public. See PATENTS VIEW, http://www.patentsview.org
(last visited May 22, 2018); Patent Examination Research Dataset (Public PAIR), U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-
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diligence on U.S. patent assets. For some types of foreign assets, it can even
be difficult to determine whether a particular patent has expired or was abandoned, let alone to obtain and scrutinize its prosecution history. Thus, for the
sake of efficiency (if not out of necessity) potential buyers often assess packages by focusing on the U.S. patent assets first and only reviewing the international counterparts later. Accordingly, buyers typically view the U.S. patents
in a package as the primary source of value, as well as a proxy for the value of
any related foreign assets in the package.
Looking across the period of our study, we see a general increase in the
number of packages offered each year. Though the increase in our raw data is
partly an artifact of our collection methodology, we see a roughly fifty percent
increase even after correcting for improvement over time in our market coverage. That said, package sizes have remained relatively stable and, if anything,
have generally trended downward in recent years. In short, from a high-level
perspective what we see is a trend toward more, but smaller, packages.
Looking closer at statistics on package size, we also see that each year’s
mean exceeds its median. As that suggests, we observed a small number of
particularly large packages in each year that we studied. However, as shown
below in Figure 2, most packages offered on the brokered market were quite
small. More than two thirds of the packages listed during the period of our
study contained ten or fewer total assets, and about half included five or fewer
assets.61 Though sales of large portfolios receive the most public attention,
brokers rarely attempt to sell packages that exceed two dozen assets in size.

data-products/patent-examination-research-dataset-public-pair (last visited May 22,
2018); Patent Assignment Search, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://assignment.uspto.gov/patent/index.html#/patent/search (last visited May 22, 2018).
61. The distribution of package sizes that we observed was also quite consistent
across the period of our study.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Brokered Packages by Number of Assets

Of the 2605 total packages that we observed during the period of our
study, approximately seventy-seven percent were presented with an (at least
approximate) asking price. As shown below in Table 2, the use of pricing
guidance has dropped in recent years. However, we do not believe that this
reflects a change in seller behavior but rather is an artifact of the increased
importance of IAM Market, which does not require sellers to post pricing information. Excluding packages collected from IAM, we collected pricing data
for approximately eighty-four percent of packages.
We do, however, observe a steep drop in asking prices, particularly when
prices are viewed relative to the number of U.S. assets they contain. On one
hand, the drop in prices likely reflects to some extent the general increase in
supply of packages that we observed above. On the other, the thirty percent
drop in median per-U.S.-asset asking prices that we observed seems unlikely
to be purely endogenous. One possible explanation is that the decline in prices
reflects recent substantive and procedural changes to U.S. patent law, especially the introduction of new administrative procedures for challenging issued
patents62 and the Supreme Court’s tightening of the scope of patentable subject
62. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified in various sections of Title 35) (“AIA”), established new procedures
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matter.63 Then again, we also find that the market grew in 2016, exceeding
both 2014 and 2015 pricing levels. This observation is arguably more difficult
to explain but may likewise reflect the dissipation of initial uncertainty about
the long-term impact of the very same changes to the law that caused prices to
dip in the two years prior. We investigate both hypotheses below when we
examine the market for software and business method patents.64

for challenging the validity of issued patents in administrative “trials” before the PTO’s
PTAB. Since these procedures went into effect in September 2012, more than 8000
petitions for PTAB review have been filed. See PTAB Overview, UNIFIED PATENTS,
https://portal.unifiedpatents.com (last visited May 22, 2018). For a comparison of the
efficacy of post-grant review procedures before and after the AIA, see Brian J. Love &
Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. DIALOGUE 93, 105 (2014) (concluding that, compared to their predecessors, post
grant proceedings established by the AIA “result in the elimination of every challenged
claim about twice as often, reach a final decision almost twice as quickly, and make
accused infringers almost twice as likely to win motions to stay co-pending litigation”).
63. For a brief summary of the evolution of case law defining the bounds of patentable subject matter in the United States, see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER: REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE PUBLIC 1 (July 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101Report_FINAL.pdf (“Between 2010 and 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued
four decisions (Bilski, Mayo, Myriad, and Alice) that shifted the dividing line between
eligible and ineligible subject matter.”).
64. See infra Part IV.C.
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Table 2: Asking Prices

Year

Num.
Packages
Observed

Num. (%)
with Price
Guidance65

Avg.66
(Median)
Asking Price
$K/Asset

Avg.
(Median)
Asking Price
$K/U.S. Asset

2012

199

155 (77.9%)

$283 ($200)

$471 ($325)

2013

377

331 (87.8%)

$275 ($185)

$382 ($313)

2014

657

564 (85.8%)

$196 ($148)

$275 ($200)

2015

709

499 (70.4%)

$174 ($121)

$256 ($167)

2016

663

446 (67.3%)

$193 ($150)

$267 ($231)

Total

2,605

1,995 (76.6%)

$210 ($150)

$302 ($231)

Based on our analysis of PTO assignment records, we estimate that close
to one quarter of the packages that we observed changed hands before the end
of 2016.67 As shown below in Table 3, about thirty to forty percent of packages
listed between 2012 and 2014 ultimately sold during the period of our study.
Though the figures reported for packages listed in 2015 and 2016 are considerably lower, this drop is explained in large part by the fact that packages often
sell many months after they are initially listed. As shown in Figure 3, roughly
thirty percent of sales that we observed took place more than one year after
listing and about ten percent were completed more than two years later. That
said, sales rates do seem to have fallen over time. We project that about twentyone percent of packages listed in 2015 and twenty-two percent of 2016 packages will ultimately sell.
Though we are generally unable to observe sales prices, we are nonetheless able to roughly estimate them, at least in the aggregate. To approximate
the correlation between asking and sales prices, we obtained actual pricing data

65. As mentioned supra, the drop in pricing guidance shown in this column is
largely the result of the rise in popularity of IAM Market. Excluding packages listed
on IAM Market, we received pricing information for about eighty-four percent of all
packages listed in 2015 and 2016.
66. Here and throughout (unless stated otherwise), the “averages” that we report
are “five percent trimmed means” that omit the highest and lowest five percent of
prices. This methodology produces more meaningful information because our pricing
data includes several extreme outliers. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
QUANTITATIVE METHODS: FOUNDATIONS 395–96 (Todd D. Little ed., 2013) (defining
“trimmed mean” and explaining that “[o]ne major advantage of the trimmed mean . . .
is that it is more resistant to outliers. . . [and thus] can make it easier to detect genuine
differences among groups”).
67. As discussed supra, there are a number of reasons to believe that our sales
statistics understate the actual sales rate to some extent. See supra notes 51–52.
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for what we believe to be a reasonably representative sample of 120 deals completed by six companies.68 In that sample, we observed that, on average, packages actually sold for about sixty-five percent of their asking price. The data
presented in Table 3 below extrapolates this estimate to all packages that we
identified as sold.69
Much like the asking prices discussed above, we estimate that per-asset
sales prices fell during the period of our study with a steady decline each year
through 2015 followed by a substantial increase in 2016. Overall, we find a
roughly thirty-five percent decline in estimated per-asset prices paid for packages that were listed in 2016 compared to those that were listed in 2012. However, we also estimate that sales prices fell a much more modest five to ten
percent when compared relative to the number of U.S. patent assets they contain.

68. Again, we obtained this data under NDA and unfortunately cannot share the
raw sales data nor disclose the names of the companies that assisted us in performing
this pricing analysis. The entities that shared pricing data with us are a mixture of large
operating companies and defensive aggregators, and the specific transactions that we
analyzed overwhelmingly involved patents covering software and/or hardware related
to information and communication technologies. As discussed infra in Parts IV.B and
IV.C, operating companies and aggregators collectively account for about sixty percent
of all brokered purchases, and almost ninety percent of all packages offered on the
brokered market cover software, hardware, or communications technologies.
69. In other words, in the sales data reported in Table 3, we assume that packages
sold (on average) for sixty-five percent of their asking price. To be clear, this estimate
is unlikely to be accurate for any individual package. However, on average over a large
group of packages, we believe it is reasonably accurate. See infra Table 3.
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Table 3: Sales Rates and Estimated Prices

Year

Num.
Packages
Observed

2012

199

2013

377

2014

657

2015

709

2016

663

Total

2,605

Num. (%)
Packages
Sold70
74
(37.2%)
128
(33.9%)
179
(27.2%)
119
(16.8%)
37
(5.6%)
537
(20.6%)

Avg. (Median)
Est. Sales
Price71
$K/Asset Sold
$205
($163)
$173
($147)
$125
($81)
$114
($81)
$135
($106)
$146
($108)

Avg. (Median)
Est. Sales Price
$K/U.S. Asset
Sold
$244
($211)
$239
($204)
$192
($163)
$170
($130)
$215
($203)
$208
($163)

Figure 3: Time to Sale

To learn more about which package characteristics impact sales, we additionally investigated the effect of package size and EOU documentation. Ta-

70. The sales figures in this column reflect only those sales recorded by December
31, 2016. As discussed supra, many sales are recorded more than one year after the
sold package was first listed; thus, our sales data for 2015 and 2016 likely underreport
the eventual number of sales by about four and sixteen percentage points, respectively.
71. As discussed supra, these statistics were calculated by discounting the asking
price of sold packages by thirty-five percent.
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ble 4 presents our sales data broken down by package size. We see little correlation between package size and likelihood of sale. Overall, the size distribution of sold packages closely matches the size distribution of listed packages,
which suggests to us that buyers have no clear preference for packages of a
particular size.
On the other hand, we do observe a strong negative correlation between
package size and average price paid per asset. While this decline in marginal
prices likely reflects a volume discount to some extent, we believe that it also
results from the fact that many sales are driven by interest in just a small number of included assets.
Table 4: Effect of Package Size

Package Size
1 Asset
% of Listed
% of Sold72
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset
2-5 Assets
% of Listed
% of Sold
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset
6-10 Assets
% of Listed
% of Sold
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2012
-16

18%
21%
$331

28%
21%
$345

17%
12%
$257

23%
11%
$277

22%
13%
$286

22%
15%
$308

33%
31%
$238

31%
30%
$196

34%
27%
$195

32%
21%
$160

25%
25%
$177

31%
27%
$195

17%
19%
$323

14%
15%
$106

15%
18%
$134

14%
20%
$89

17%
10%
$122

15%
17%
$148

72. Hereinafter, all annual sales figures reflect sales (recorded before December
31, 2016) of patents that were listed for sale in the indicated year, not all sales that took
place during the indicated year (regardless of when the purchased patent was listed).
Thus, for example, the data in the first three rows of the adjacent column is meant to
communicate: (i) that eighteen percent of all packages listed in 2012 included a single
asset, (ii) that twenty-one percent of all packages listed in 2012 that sold before December 31, 2016, included a single asset, and (iii) that the average price paid for singleasset packages listed in 2012 (but sold any time before December 31, 2016) was about
$331,000.
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Package Size
11-25 Assets
% of Listed
% of Sold
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset
26-50 Assets
% of Listed
% of Sold
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset
51-100 Asset
% of Listed
% of Sold
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset
101-200 Assets
% of Listed
% of Sold
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset

[Vol. 83

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2012
-16

15%
16%
$124

12%
12%
$80

18%
23%
$77

17%
30%
$86

18%
23%
$32

17%
21%
$83

8%
6%
$24

7%
9%
$96

7%
9%
$53

9%
12%
$64

8%
14%
$100

8%
10%
$68

4%
4%
$10

5%
11%
$70

6%
6%
$49

4%
5%
$35

7%
10%
$38

6%
7%
$49

6%
3%
$7

3%
3%
$51

2%
5%
$61

1%
2%
$16

2%
4%
-

2%
4%
$47

As shown below in Table 5, about thirty-seven percent of the packages
that we observed were circulated along with EOUs. This practice is yet another
reason to believe that the sale of many packages is driven by interest in just a
fraction of the included assets. An EOU is intended to convince potential buyers that the technology covered by at least one asset in the package is incorporated in a popular product, and the EOUs that we observed virtually always
focused on one asset (or one family of assets), even when the offered package
itself was quite large.
Moreover, our data suggests that EOUs are important to buyers. Packages
listed with EOUs were disproportionately likely to sell and, in addition, appear
to have sold at a premium. Overall, we estimate that packages with EOUs
commanded per-asset prices that were about fourteen percent higher than those
paid for packages without some evidence of use.
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Table 5: Effect of EOUs

Packages with EOU
% of Listed
% of Sold73
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset
Packages without EOU
% of Listed
% of Sold
Avg. Est. Sales Price
$K/Asset

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2012
-16

30%
38%
$246

46%
56%
$170

32%
49%
$141

37%
57%
$120

39%
51%
$156

37%
51%
$155

70%
62%
$175

54%
44%
$179

68%
51%
$109

63%
43%
$100

60%
49%
$102

63%
49%
$134

Table 6 lists the companies most often mentioned in the EOUs that we
observed. Perhaps not surprisingly, they are among the largest and highest
grossing technology companies in the world. They are also among those sued
most often for patent infringement. On the whole, we see little evidence that
EOUs are meant to convey that implementing patented technologies would be
valuable for buyers. Rather, it is our experience that EOUs are intended to
demonstrate that assets in the package could be asserted in a lucrative lawsuit
or licensing negotiation. This also tends to support our conclusion that sales
are typically driven by just a fraction of included assets because, as a practical
matter, a patentee generally cannot assert more than a handful of patents in any
one lawsuit.74

73. See supra note 72.
74. See Jonathan H. Ashtor et al., Patents at Issue: The Data Behind the Patent

Troll Debate, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 957, 958 (2014) (finding that patentees asserted
two to four patents per lawsuit on average between 1995 and 2011).
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Table 6: Most Mentioned Companies in EOUs
Company
(No. Mentions)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Google (171)
Apple (164)
Microsoft (132)
Samsung (116)
Cisco (74)
Facebook (57)
Amazon (51)
Oracle (46)

2016 (Fiscal)
Annual Revenue
($B)
$90.376
$215.8
$92.1
$175.577
$49.2
$27.6
$136.0
$37.0

No. U.S. Patent Cases
in Which Named as
Def. (2012-16)75
142
268
151
271
71
65
51
35

Finally, we estimate the size of the annual brokered market. Correcting
for gaps in our data’s coverage, we estimate that the brokered market for patent
sales exceeded $225 million per year. As with both asking and sales prices,
our estimates suggest that the overall market dropped in recent years before
rebounding in 2016. Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the
total amount patentees collect each year in licensing revenue and lawsuit settlements, we think it is fair to say that these annual totals fall below three per-

75. We collected this data by searching Lex Machina for all patent cases in which
each company (or one of its subsidiaries) was named as a defendant. See Cases Filed
by Year, supra note 59.
76. Revenue for Google’s parent Alphabet, Inc. Annual Revenue of Alphabet from
2011 to 2017 (in Million U.S. dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/507742/alphabet-annual-global-revenue/ (last visited May 22, 2018).
77. 201.9 trillion KRW. For conversion of currency rates, see XE Currency Converter:
USD
to
KRW,
XE,
http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=KRW (last visited May 22, 2018).
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cent of annual revenue derived from U.S. patent litigation (including both settlements and damages awards)78 and, moreover, constitute less than one percent of all revenue earned annually worldwide from patent licenses and sales.79
Table 7: Estimated Annual Brokered Market Size ($ Million)
2012

-80

2013

-

2014

$251

2015

$229

2016

$263

B. Buyers and Sellers
Next, we look at the types of entities that participate in the brokered market. We compare the sales and purchasing activities of various kinds of market
participants and also examine more closely the behavior of privately owned
operating companies, PAEs, and universities.

78. A survey conducted by RPX in 2012 placed the average settlement amount for
U.S. patent suits filed by NPEs at $1.33 million per case for small companies and $7.27
million for large companies. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs
from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 400 (2014). Moreover, there were an
average of 5409 U.S. patent cases filed each year between 2012 and 2016. See Cases
Filed by Year, supra note 59. Further, according to Lex Machina, district courts
awarded a total of about $15 billion in patent damages awards between 2000 and 2013,
OWEN BYRD ET AL., LEX MACHINA PATENT LITIGATION DAMAGES REPORT 1 (2014) (on
file with authors) (reporting that during the period 2000–2013 U.S. courts awarded a
total of $15.4 billion in damages, fees, and costs in patent suits), though many of these
awards were subsequently overturned or reduced on appeal. Roughly speaking, these
figures safely place the annual revenue that patentees earned from U.S. patent litigation
above $8 billion.
79. As cited above, existing estimates of the average total revenue earned from
patent transactions range from about $35 billion to $100 billion. See supra note 3.
80. Because sales often take place well after a package is listed, a large portion of
sales that took place in 2012 and 2013 likely involved packages that were listed in 2010
and 2011, before we began collecting data. Thus, we lack sufficient evidence to estimate the size of the entire market in 2012 and 2013.
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First, as shown below in Figure 4, we find that the majority of packages
sold were listed by product-producing technology companies. In each year that
we studied, operating companies were responsible for the majority of listed
packages and, overall, operating companies listed about two thirds of all sold
packages that we observed.
Figure 4: Distribution of Sellers by Entity Type81

Looking at other types of sellers, we observe two noteworthy trends.
First, the percentage of packages sold by individual inventors dropped considerably – by more than fifty percent – during the period of our study. At the
same time, the percentage of packages sold by PAEs increased by a factor of
four. Though our data cannot say for sure, we do not believe that these trends
are (directly) related.82 We suspect that the decline in individual sellers reflects
the general decline in prices discussed above. Because individuals typically
offer especially small packages and enter the market on a one-time basis, they
are likely more sensitive to declining prices than repeat sellers with higher volumes. We believe that the increase in sales by PAEs may result from decreasing returns to patent assertion following, for example, the introduction of new
post-grant patent proceedings in late 201283 and the Supreme Court’s 2014
81. The “Other” category includes law firms, trusts, religious organizations, and
packages for which we were unable to determine the owner.
82. For example, we do not believe that PAEs are increasingly re-selling patents
privately sourced from individuals.
83. To date, almost 3600 PTAB petitions have been filed challenging NPE-owned
patents, representing about forty-five percent of all PTAB petitions. PTAB Search,
UNIFIED PATENTS, https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/ptab/analytics/case-level/by-status-and-phase?upentity=NPE+%28Patent+Assertion+Entity%29&up_entity=NPE+%28Small+Compan
y%29&up_entity=NPE+%28Individual%29 (last visited May 22, 2018). Moreover,
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opinion in Alice v. CLS Bank.84 PAEs that purchased patents in years past may
now be looking to unload assets that, in today’s litigation environment, are insufficiently profitable.
We also observe that different types of sellers tend to list different types
of packages. Not surprisingly, we see that individuals sell the smallest packages, while operating technology companies sell the largest. We also see variation in pricing across different types of sellers. Patents sold by individuals
and PAEs sell at disproportionately high prices, which may support our suspicions about the reasons for their respective decline and rise in the market. Individuals with all but the most promising packages may be deterred by the cost
of entering the market, while PAEs may be looking to re-sell patents that, while
relatively less valuable today, were nonetheless carefully vetted for high value
in years past and retain much of that value.85 Interestingly, packages offered
by universities sold for the lowest prices of any group. While this may reflect
the fact that universities are non-profit institutions that (ideally) engage in technology transfer with more than sheer profitability in mind, it may also reflect

NPE-owned patents have been both instituted and (at least partially) cancelled by the
PTAB at higher rates than patents owned by operating tech companies. See id.
84. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). The Court’s
decision in Alice substantially (and retroactively) narrowed the scope of patentability
for software-implemented algorithms, an outcome that left many existing software-related patents vulnerable to attack. See Robert R. Sachs, AliceStorm Update for Q1
2017, BILSKIBLOG (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/04/alicestormupdate-for-q1-2017.html (reporting that, post-Alice, sixty-seven percent of patentable
subject matter decisions issued by U.S. courts – 317 out of 473 total decisions through
March 2017 – at least partially invalidated the patent(s)-at-issue). This development
disproportionately impacts PAEs because PAEs assert software patents more often than
other patentees.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 22 (Aug. 2013),
http://1.usa.gov/1gatCRr (“Specifically, about 84 percent of [PAE] lawsuits from 2007
to 2011 involved software-related patents, while about 35 percent of operating company lawsuits did . . . . By defendant, software-related patents were used to sue 93
percent of the defendants in [PAE] suits and 46 percent of the defendants in operating
company suits . . . .”).
85. At least one study found that patents acquired by PAEs were of higher quality,
at least as measured by forward citations, than patents acquired by other purchasers.
See Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology – An
Empirical Analysis of NPEs’ Patent Acquisitions, 41 RES. POL’Y 1519, 1526 (2012)
(“NPEs acquire patents that, on average, lie in denser technology fields, received more
forward citations, have more claims, are older, and lie in more crowded technology
fields than patents acquired by practicing firms.”).
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that university patents are of relatively low quality86 or that universities are less
effective than other entities at managing their patent portfolios.87

86. Some studies have linked increased patenting by universities with a decrease
in overall university patent quality. See Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a
Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965–
1988, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119 (1998) (finding that university patent quality, as
measured by citation analysis, declined dramatically following enactment of the BayhDole Act); Christos Kolympiris & Peter G. Klein, The Effects of Academic Incubators
on University Innovation, 11 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 145 (2017) (finding that
the quality of university patents is negatively correlated with the establishment of a
university-affiliated startup incubator). However, other studies have called these findings into question. See Bhaven N. Sampat et al., Changes in University Patent Quality
After the Bayh-Dole Act: A Re-Examination, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1371, 1388 (2003)
(explaining that Henderson et al.’s findings may reflect “truncation bias” due to their
citation data covering an insufficiently long period of time).
87. For example, multiple studies have found that universities tend to lose money
on their patent holdings, see Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence
from a Survey of University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering,
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 313 (2014) (estimating based on a survey of university
professors of electrical engineering and computer science at highly ranked U.S. universities that these universities collectively lost money pursuing “high tech” patents);
WALTER D. VALDIVIA, UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 9 (Nov. 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Valdivia_Tech-Transfer_v29_No-Embargo.pdf (estimating that 130 of
155 surveyed universities lost money on their patent programs in 2012).
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Table 8: Sales Data by Seller Entity Type

Num.
(% of Total)
Packages
Sold
Avg. (Median) Total
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) U.S. Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) Est.
Sales Price
$K/Asset
Avg. (Median) Est.
Sales Price
$K/U.S. Asset

PAE

University

Def.
Aggregator

Operating
Co.

71
(13%)

80
(15%)

14
(3%)

11
(2%)

353
(66%)

537
(100%)

6.2
(2)

10.3
(5)

12.7
(9)

4.8
(3)

25.3
(11)

15.0
(5)

3.0
(2)

6.4
(5)

11.1
(9)

2.6
(3)

17.7
(11)

9.2
(3)

$196
($163)

$158
($130)

$111
($94)

$122
($106)

$134
($93)

$135
($98)

$244
($211)

$236
($184)

$128
($96)

$149
($98)

$197
($163)

$195
($150)

Individ.
Inventor

Total

While sellers come in many shapes and sizes, buyers are a more uniform
group. As with listed packages, the majority of purchased packages are acquired by product-producing technology companies. As shown below in Figure 5, operating companies (acting in their own capacity) make up the largest
subset of buyers. Collectively, they buy about forty percent of packages that
sell. Defensive aggregators purchase an additional twenty percent of brokered
patents on behalf of their operating company members. Virtually all of the
remaining packages – about forty percent of those that are sold – are purchased
by PAEs.
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Figure 5: Buyers by Entity Type88

While we saw a good deal of variation in price and package size among
sellers, we see far less variation among types of buyers. PAEs and defensive
aggregators, in particular, paid similar per-asset prices for packages of similar
sizes. On average, the two groups of buyers have virtually identical statistics.
By comparison, operating companies bought somewhat larger packages for
somewhat lower per-asset prices.
Turning to litigation data, we see that purchased patents are frequently
litigated when purchased by PAEs but very rarely litigated when acquired by
operating companies. One third of patent packages purchased by PAEs included at least one U.S. patent that was asserted89 after the sale’s completion.
By contrast, only about three percent of packages purchased by operating companies and defensive aggregators90 included a later-asserted patent. Overall,

88. The “other” category includes five individuals, two universities, one law firm,
and nine buyers that we were unable to identify.
89. In the charts that follow we report statistics for packages including at least one
asset that was either enforced in a patent infringement case filed in a U.S. court or
challenged in a petition filed with the PTAB. We include patents that were challenged
in a PTAB petition, but not litigated in federal court, in our statistics because it is our
experience that such challenges often follow a threat of assertion made out of court.
That said, this decision does not have a significant impact on our results. Only four
packages (out of the seventy-eight total litigated or challenged) included an asset that
had been challenged before PTAB but not an asset that was asserted in court.
90. We observed that a total of two packages purchased by defensive aggregators
were later litigated in U.S. court. However, these packages were not in fact litigated
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PAEs purchased eighty-three percent of packages that were asserted at least
once in U.S. court post-sale. Moreover, PAEs filed suit more quickly, waiting
on average only about five months before filing suit. Patents purchased by
operating companies and defensive aggregators were asserted much later, on
average well over a year after purchase.

by the aggregators themselves. Rather, these packages were purchased, licensed to the
aggregators’ members, and then re-sold to PAEs that asserted them later.
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Table 9: Sales and Assertion Data by Buyer Entity Type
PAE
Num. (% of
Total) Packages
Purchased
Avg. (Median)
Total
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median)
U.S.
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median)
Est. Sales
Price/Asset
Purchased
Avg. (Median)
Est. Sales
Price/U.S. Asset
Purchased
Num. Packages
Litigated or
Challenged
Post-Purchase
% of Total Num.
Packages
Litigated or
Challenged
% of Num.
Packages
Purchased by
Entity Type
Avg. (Median)
Num. Days from
Sale to First Suit
or Challenge

Def.
OperatAggregaing Co.
tor

Other91

Total

198
(37%)

98
(18%)

225
(42%)

16
(3%)

537
(100%)

17.2
(7.0)

16.3
(6.0)

23.7
(10.0)

-

15.0
(5.0)

12.6
(7.0)

13.0
(6.0)

14.9
(10.0)

-

9.2
(3.0)

$158
($110)

$161
($120)

$128
($90)

-

$135
($98)

$215
($163)

$235
($204)

$187
($163)

-

$195
($150)

65

292

9

2

78

83%

3%

12%

3%

100%

33%

2%

4%

12.5%

14.5%

153.2
(100.0)

388.5
(388.5)

443.7
(359.0)

-

186.9
(106.0)

91. As in Figure 5, supra, the “other” category includes individuals, universities,
a law firm, and a few buyers that we were unable to identify. Because these groups are
individually very small, and collectively very heterogeneous, we have omitted their
statistics from Table 9.
92. See supra note 90. Both packages were actually enforced by PAEs to which
the patents were subsequently re-sold.
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Total) Suits and
Challenges Filed
Post-Purchase
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PAE

Def. Aggregator

Operating Co.

Other

Total

934
(84.5%)

110
(10.0%)

39
(3.5%)

22
(2.0%)

1105
(100%)

To learn more about parties’ motivations for buying and selling, we also
took a closer look at various subsets of buyers and sellers, including those that
are most active in the market, operating companies that have not yet gone public, PAEs, and universities. Table 10 below shows the top ten most frequent
buyers and sellers in the brokered market. The two groups make for an interesting comparison. The top sellers are, by and large, established incumbents.
AT&T, IBM, Xerox, and Alcatel Lucent have each been in business for well
over a century, and Panasonic isn’t too far behind.93 Though responsible for
some of the most important innovations of the twentieth century,94 these firms
have since largely moved away from manufacturing and today make a good
deal of their revenue from selling patent rights instead of products.95
93. AT&T’s predecessors date back to 1875. A Brief History: Origins, AT&T,
https://www.corp.att.com/history/history1.html (last visited May 22, 2018). IBM was
founded in 1911.
IBM Is Founded, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/founded/ (last visited May 22, 2018). Xerox’s predecessor
was founded in 1906. Always Moving. Making History for More Than 100 Years,
XEROX, https://www.xerox.com/about-xerox/history-timeline/1950-decade/enus.html
(last visited May 22, 2018). And both Alcatel and Lucent have predecessors that date
back to the nineteenth century. Alcatel-Lucent History, NOKIA, https://www.noki
a.com/en_int/about-us/who-we-are/our-history (last visited May 22, 2018).
94. For example, scientists and engineers working at Bell Labs, which was established by AT&T and later spun off to Lucent, played a central role in the invention of
many revolutionary technologies, including the transistor and laser. See, e.g., JOHN
GERTNER, THE IDEA FACTORY: BELL LABS AND THE GREAT AGE OF AMERICAN
INNOVATION 255 (2012). Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (“PARC”) also played a
crucial role in the development of many personal computing technologies, including
laser printing, the graphical user interface, and the mouse. See, e.g., MICHAEL HILTZIK,
DEALERS OF LIGHTNING: XEROX PARC AND THE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER AGE (1999).
95. For example, IBM sold its personal computer division to Lenovo in 2005, as
well as its x86 server division in 2014. Stephen Shankland, IBM Sells Its x86 Server
Business to Lenovo for $2.3 Billion, CNET (Jan. 23, 2014, 2:33 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/ibm-sells-its-x86-server-business-to-lenovo-for-2-3-billion/. IBM’s revenues also fell every year during the period of our study. How IBM
Makes Money? Understanding IBM Business Model, REVENUE & PROFITS, http://revenuesandprofits.com/how-ibm-makes-money/ (last visited May 22, 2018). Similarly,
Xerox recently split into two separate companies after “annual revenue and net income
decline[d] every year going back to at least 2011, dropping roughly $2.5 billion in total
revenues from 2011–2015.” Todd Clausen, Xerox Completes Split into 2 Companies,
USA TODAY (Jan. 3, 2017 1:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/nationnow/2017/01/03/xerox-conduent-split-complete/96110370/. Alcatel-Lucent merged
with Nokia in 2016. Dominic Chopping, Nokia, Alcatel-Lucent Set to Put Merger to
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The group of top buyers is a bit more diverse. It is made up of three
defensive aggregators, three PAEs, and four frequent targets of patent assertion.96 Though different in many respects, these buyers all share an acute interest in the litigation value of the patents they purchased: the PAEs for purposes of revenue generation and the others for risk mitigation. Compared to
sellers, operating companies on this side of the ledger are much younger and
much more heavily invested in producing goods and services (relative to licensing).
Table 10: Top 10 Sellers and Buyers
Rank97
1.
2.
3.
4.

Sellers

5.
6.
6.
8.
8.

AT&T
PARC (Xerox)
Panasonic Corp.
Verizon
Communications, Inc.
Cypress Semi. Corp.
Alcatel Lucent
IBM
Allied Security Trust
Hewlett Packard Enter.

8.

Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd.

8.

Intel Corp.

Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.

Buyers
RPX Corp.
Intellectual Ventures
Allied Security Trust
Google, Inc.

5.
5.
7.
7.
9.

Knapp Investment Co.
Rakuten, Inc.
Apple, Inc.
LinkedIn Corp.
Intellectual Discovery Co.,
Ltd.
Open Innovation Network,
LLC

9.

To learn more about the market activity of larger and smaller companies,
we compared the activities of public and private operating companies. As

Work, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2016, 7:06 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nokia-alcatel-lucent-set-to-put-merger-to-work-1451896364.
96. As shown in Table 6, Apple and Google were collectively sued more than 400
times for patent infringement during the period 2012 to 2016. RPX reports that, during
the same period, Rakuten (or one of its subsidiaries) was sued for patent infringement
fifty-five times and LinkedIn thirty-six times. RPX INSIGHT, https://insight.rpxcorp.com/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). For a unique look into the defensive calculations
behind LinkedIn’s patent purchases during this period, see Sara Harrington, Pierre Keeley, Kent Richardson & Erik Oliver, How and Why LinkedIn Learned to Love Patents,
INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Mar./Apr. 2017, at 26, 26 (“In 2012 LinkedIn found itself a
potential target for corporate patent asserters. It had revenue reaching nearly $1 billion,
with growth of 86%, yet owned only 22 patents. However, this changed fundamentally
from 2012 to mid-2016, when LinkedIn grew its organic portfolio from 36 to over 1,000
patent assets and purchased more than 900, dramatically reducing its risk profile.”).
97. The rankings reported in this table are based on the total number of packages
sold or purchased, respectively.
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shown below in Table 11, both groups sold a similar number of packages during the period of our study and made a similar proportion of their sales to other
types of market participants. However, public companies purchased about
three times as many packages as privately-owned firms. On one hand, this data
is consistent with the traditional narrative that patents help early stage companies transfer technology to larger firms that are better positioned to bring a
product to market. Indeed, we see more than twice as many packages moving
from private to public companies as we see moving in the opposite direction.98
However, we otherwise see little evidence that the brokered market directly
facilitates technology transfer.
Instead, we suspect that the differences we see in buying activity are
largely explained by the relative likelihood that public and private firms will
be sued for patent infringement. Private companies tend to be younger and
smaller and, thus, generally make less attractive targets for patent suits. Consequently, they have less incentive to build a defensive portfolio or preemptively acquire patents that might otherwise wind up in the hands of a competitor
or PAE. Additionally, it is our anecdotal experience that private companies
selling patents are disproportionately likely to be doing so because they are in
extreme financial straits, if not already in the process of winding down their
operations. Companies in that situation, again, make poor targets for patent
infringement suits.

98. This finding stands somewhat in contrast to Chien’s finding that transfers of
software patents tend to go from older, larger, and higher-earning (public) companies
to younger, newer, lower-earning (public) companies. See Chien, supra note 11, at
1707.
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Table 11: Private vs. Public Operating Companies
Public Operating
Companies
Num. Packages Sold
Num. (%) Sold to
Pub. Op. Cos.
Num. (%) Sold to
Priv. Op. Cos.
Num. (%) Sold to
Def. Aggregators
Num. (%) Sold to
PAEs
Num. Packages
Purchased
Num. (%) Purchased
from Pub. Op. Cos.
Num. (%) Purchased
from Priv. Op. Cos.
Num. (%) Purchased
from Def.
Aggregators
Num. (%) Purchased
from PAEs

Private Operating
Companies

194

159

82 (42%)

42 (26%)

17 (9%)

21 (13%)

27 (14%)

37 (23%)

67 (35%)

53 (33%)

169

56

82 (49%)

17 (30%)

42 (25%)

21 (38%)

6 (4%)

1 (2%)

18 (11%)

8 (14%)

Turning next to a closer examination of deals involving PAEs, we see that
operating companies are not just the largest source overall of offered patents
but also the largest source of assets purchased by PAEs. In addition, we observe that packages listed by publicly traded operating companies – the subset
of patentees that should possess the most experience with patent assertion – are
the source of about one third of packages that PAEs purchased on the brokered
market during the period of our study. Privately held companies and individuals, the two groups that we would expect to benefit the most from PAEs’ expertise in patent assertion,99 sold fewer packages to PAEs, accounting for about
twenty-seven and eighteen percent respectively of PAEs’ purchases.

99. One potential benefit of PAEs is that they serve as enforcement specialists.
See Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAES), 99
MINN. L. REV. 649, 653 (2014) (noting that “[d]efenders of PAEs have offered several
purported benefits” including that “PAEs are claimed to be specialists in patent enforcement who are skilled in evaluating allegations of infringement and hiring and
supervising law firms to keep costs down”); Axel Haus & Steffen Juranek, NonPracticing Entities: Enforcement Specialists? (May 20, 2016) (working paper) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424407) (providing a
theoretical model and empirical support for this view of PAEs).
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Table 12: PAE Purchases
Num. Packages Purchased

198

Num. (%) Purchased from Pub. Op. Cos.

67 (34%)

Num. (%) Purchased from Priv. Op. Cos.

53 (27%)

Num. (%) Purchased from Def. Aggregators

3 (2%)

Num. (%) Purchased from PAEs

27 (14%)

Num. (%) Purchased from Individuals

35 (18%)

Num. (%) Purchased from Universities

9 (5%)

Finally, we observe that a small but significant percentage of PAE patents
were purchased from universities. As shown below in Table 13, sales to PAEs
constitute the overwhelming majority of all packages sold by universities.100
Based on the listing prices of packages transferred from universities to PAEs,
we estimate that universities earned a total of about $13 million from brokered
sales of 115 assets to PAEs during the five years covered by our study. Interestingly, these sales took place despite a public stance among universities that
“universities would better serve the public interest by . . . requiring their licensees to operate under a business model that encourages commercialization and
does not rely primarily on threats of infringement litigation to generate revenue.”101 These transactions, and the substantial monetary reward associated
with them, may help explain why universities so strenuously opposed patent

100. See Yarden Katz, Universities Have Turned over Hundreds of Patents to Patent Trolls, MEDIUM (Oct. 13, 2016), https://medium.com/@yardenkatz/universitieshave-turned-over-hundreds-of-patents-to-patent-trolls-99d5cdec1d8a#.315c8xj7c (reporting that “nearly 500 of IV’s patents originally belonged to universities, including
state schools”).
101. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY
8
(Mar.
6,
2007),
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

37

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7

396

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

reform legislation in recent years.102 They may also support ongoing efforts to
encourage individual universities to pledge not to sell patents to PAEs.103
Table 13: University Patent Sales
Packages

Assets

14104

178

Num. (%) Sold to Pub. Op. Cos.

2 (14%)

11 (6%)

Num. (%) Sold to Priv. Op. Cos.

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Num. (%) Sold to Def. Aggregators

2 (14%)

37 (21%)

Num. (%) Sold to PAEs

9 (64%)

115 (65%)

Num. Sold

C. Technology
Finally, we examine how transactions differ across various technologies.
Table 14 below presents our data broken down into four broad technology categories. We first observe that the vast majority of packages relate to computing
and telecommunications. Together, patents covering software and hardware
102. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Patent Trolls Have a Surprising Ally: Universities,
WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/30/patent-trolls-have-a-surprising-ally-universities/ (noting that several university groups publicly expressed opposition to a patent reform bill “target[ing] patent trolls” that passed in the House in 2013).
103. See Elliot Harmon, Tell Your University: Don’t Sell Patents to Trolls,
ELECTRIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Aug.
17,
2016),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/tell-your-university-dont-sell-patents-trolls
(introducing a campaign to encourage universities to agree to a “Public Interest Patent
Pledge” stating that they would “take appropriate steps to research the past practices of
potential buyers or licensees and favor parties whose business practices are designed to
benefit society through commercialization and invention” and “strive to ensure that any
company we sell or license patents to does not have a history of litigation that resembles
patent trolling”).
104. One additional package containing fifteen total assets was transferred back to
its faculty inventor. During this time, universities also tried unsuccessfully to sell many
more assets on an ad hoc basis. For example, in 2014 Penn State held an online patent
auction that netted just one sale. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Penn State’s Patent Auction
Produces More Lessons Than Revenue, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 1, 2014),
https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/bottomline/penn-states-patent-auction-producesmore-lessons-than-revenue/ (“[T]he university got just one bid on [a] single pair of patents out of 53 batches” and that bidder “offered the minimum bid, $10,000.”).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/7

38

Love et al.: An Empirical Look at the "Brokered" Market for Patents

2018]

THE "BROKERED" MARKET FOR PATENTS

397

for computers and mobile devices make up about eighty-eight percent of brokered listings and ninety-five percent of brokered sales.
This of course means that we saw very few packages related to pharmaceuticals, biotech, or medical devices. Though surprising at first glance, this
finding actually meshes well with what we know about the biopharma industry,
as well as with many of the observations described above. For one, while complex consumer electronics often incorporate tens of thousands of patented technologies,105 medical treatments are typically protected by no more than a handful of patents.106 Thus, we would expect there to be relatively few patents
worth transacting in those fields. In addition, PAEs virtually never enforce
patents on drugs, diagnostics, or other medical technologies,107 and thus there
is little risk for operating companies in this field to mitigate through proactive
purchases. Though there is a great deal of technology transfer in these industries,108 it does not appear to occur through the brokered market. In our experience, it happens instead primarily through mergers and acquisitions, in which
entire startups (including their patent rights) are transferred to established
firms.109
105. RPX once estimated that approximately 250,000 patents cover some aspect of
a smartphone. RPX Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2011) (available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm). Another study put the total (including design patents) at close to 315,000. JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., PATENTS AND
SMALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE SMARTPHONE INDUSTRY 6 (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/clip_smartphone_patent.pdf.
106. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a
Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 316–17 (2010) (reporting that pharmaceuticals are
typically protected by just two to four patents per drug).
107. See 2016 Annual Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIED PATENTS (Jan. 1, 2017),
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/12/28/2016-annual-patent-dispute-report
(reporting that just 39 of the 2630 total cases filed by PAEs in 2016 asserted patents
covering “medical” technology, defined as “[t]echnologies relating to pharmaceuticals,
medical devices, and any other health-related technologies”).
108. See Chien, supra note 11, at 1701–02 (finding that approximately one to two
percent of biotech patents changed hands each year between 2012 and 2015); Serrano,
supra note 11, at 693 (reporting that sixteen percent of patents covering “drugs and
medical” technology were transferred during their term of protection, the highest rate
observed among technology classifications).
109. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability:
Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 167
(2001) (“[T]he American biotechnology industry . . . . operates according to a ‘mayfly’
or ‘small company’ model that explicitly seeks to unleash hundreds of small, lean (with
regard to capital resources), and largely similar firms to engage, for the duration of their
frequently short lives, in a voracious search for ways of converting bioscience into marketable technology.”); Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
987, 1010 (2000) (“Since . . . 1980, biotechnological product development generally
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Table 14: Sales Data by Technology

Num. Packages
Observed (% of
Total Packages
Observed)
Avg. (Median)
Total Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) U.S.
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median)
Asking $K
Price/Asset
Avg. (Median)
Asking $K
Price/U.S. Asset
Num. Packages
Sold (% of Total
Packages Sold)
Avg. (Median)
Total Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) U.S.
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) Est.
Sales Price/Asset
Sold
Avg. (Median) Est.
Sales Price/U.S.
Asset Sold
Num. Packages
Litigated or
Challenged
Post-Purchase

Software

Hardware

Communications

1,185
(45%)

652
(25%)

11.0
(4)

Other
110

Total

447
(17%)

321
(12%)

2,605
(100%)

19.9
(7)

18.3
(8)

14.8
(4)

15.0
(5)

6.9
(2)

13.3
(5)

10.3
(4)

8.3
(2)

9.2
(3)

$240
($167)

$171
($125)

$204
($149)

$161
($108)

$208
($150)

$324
($250)

$271
($172)

$297
($227)

$240
($163)

$297
($231)

277
(52%)

114
(21%)

121
(23%)

25
(5%)

537
(100%)

13.5
(5)

30.2
(11)

22.9
(10)

21.0
(14)

19.5
(8)

8.6
(4)

22.6
(8)

15.5
(7)

13.9
(3)

13.4
(5)

$161
($130)

$104
($91)

$161
($125)

$105
($59)

$146
($108)

$215
($163)

$183
($108)

$210
($163)

$218
($179)

$208
($163)

45

12

16

5

78

has taken place through collaborative networks that . . . match up a small biotechnology
firm, which primarily attends to basic research and early product development, and a
large pharmaceutical firm, which primarily attends to clinical testing, marketing, and
distribution.”).
110. The “other” category includes patents covering medical, pharmaceutical, and
other miscellaneous technologies.
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% of Total Packages Litigated or
Challenged
% of Total Num.
Sold in Each Tech
Category
Num. (%) of Suits
and Challenges
Filed Post-Purchase

399

Software

Hardware

Communications

Other

Total

57.7%

15.4%

20.5%

6.4%

100%

16.2%

10.5%

13.2%

20%

14.5%

728
(65.9%)

67
(6.1%)

231
(20.9%)

79
(7.1%)

1,105
(100%)

Looking closer at the technology categories for which we did see a large
number of packages, software stands out as the most interesting. During the
period of our study, more software packages were offered for sale than the
combined total of packages including hardware- and communications-related
assets. Software packages were also listed with higher per-asset prices, about
fifteen percent above the overall average. Moreover, these prices do not seem
to have been viewed as unduly high by purchasers because software packages
sold at higher rates than all other packages and ultimately made up more than
half of all packages sold during the period of our study. Post-purchase, software patents were asserted most often, too, accounting for almost sixty percent
of litigated packages.
What makes these findings even more interesting is that they span a period when several legal developments called into question the patentability of
software and erected additional hurdles to the enforcement of issued software
patents. Special administrative procedures for challenging issued “covered
business method” patents became available in September 2012.111 To date,
more than 500 of these challenges have been initiated against software patents
asserted in court.112 In addition, perhaps no development in the last decade has
affected the patent system more than the revival of limitations on patentable
subject matter. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s June 2014 opinion in Alice

111. For an overview of procedural rules applicable in “covered business method”
reviews, see Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/transitional-program-covered-business (last visited May 22, 2018).
112. See LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (statistics collected on Feb. 21,
2017). Since the creation of CBM review, more than 500 petitions for review have
been filed. Id. Approximately eighty-six percent of petitions litigated to an institution
decision on the merits were instituted by the PTAB. Id. About eighty-seven percent
of instituted petitions litigated to a final decision on the merits resulted in the cancellation of all instituted claims. Id.
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v. CLS Bank, which significantly curtailed the scope of patentable subject matter for software-enabled invention,113 many made dire predictions about the
case’s impact on the value of high-tech patents.114
However, as shown below in Table 15, the market for software patents
hardly cratered in 2012 or 2014.115 To be sure, we observe that per-asset prices
for software patents fell between 2012 and 2015. Median per-asset asking
prices fell more than twenty-five percent over this period. However, we also
observe that prices rebounded in 2016. In addition, the size and number of
software patent packages increased markedly during the period of our study.
In our view, these trends likely reflect the introduction – and subsequent
dissipation – of uncertainty in the market for software patents over the last five
years. As uncertainty about the patentability and enforceability of software
assets grew, sellers responded by lowering asking prices and buyers responded
by buying larger packages, perhaps in hopes that at least one asset in the package would eventually prove valuable. Over time, prices began to recover as
case law on software patentability continued to develop and as PTAB practice
became more predictable.

113. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358–59 (2014).
114. See, e.g., Kelly Mackin, How Alice Is Undermining the American Economy,

LAW360 (Mar. 29, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/773025/howalice-is-undermining-the-american-economy (estimating that the Alice decision resulted in “$24 billion in direct economic damage” to patent owners and possibly as
much as “$40 billion or even $60 billion”).
115. Accord Chien, supra note 11, at 1700 (finding that “[r]ather than declining,
the absolute number of software patent transfers has actually increased, from around
5,900 patents per year in 2012 to 8,900 patents per year in 2015, a 68% rise”).
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Table 15: Software Patents by Year

Num. Software Packages (% of Annual
Total Packages)
Observed
Avg. (Median) Total
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) U.S.
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median)
Asking Price/Asset
Avg. (Median)
Asking Price/U.S.
Asset
Num. Software
Packages (% of
Annual Total
Packages) from
Listing Year that
Sold116
Avg. (Median) Total
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) U.S.
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) Est.
Sales Price/Asset
Sold
Avg. (Median) Est.
Sales Price/U.S.
Asset Sold
Num. Software
Packages (% of
Annual Total
Packages) from
Listing Year
Litigated or
Challenged
Post-Purchase117

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

90
(45%)

209
(55%)

316
(48%)

292
(41%)

278
(42%)

9.0
(4)
4.5
(2)
$297
($241)

8.0
(3)
4.3
(1)
$292
($250)

12.0
(4)
8.1
(2)
$220
($163)

9.8
(4)
6.5
(2)
$207
($150)

14.1
(5)
8.6
(3)
$228
($167)

$359
($319)

$393
($325)

$310
($250)

$304
($200)

$285
($250)

35
(47%)

74
(59%)

86
(48%)

59
(50%)

22
(59%)

7.6
(4)
3.7
(2)

8.4
(3)
5.9
(2)

17.9
(7)
11.7
(4.5)

13.7
(8)
9.8
(5)

22.9
(11.5)
10.7
(4.5)

$221
($163)

$192
($163)

$132
($81)

$129
($88)

$121
($74)

$248
($211)

$255
($217)

$198
($163)

$162
($127)

$184
($176)

4
(57%)

12
(67%)

10
(42%)

17
(68%)

2
(50%)

116. See supra note 72.
117. As with all annual sales figures reported supra, these statistics reflect observ-

able assertions (initiated before December 31, 2016) of patents that were listed for sale
in the indicated year, not all observable assertions that took place during the indicated
year (regardless of when the asserted patent was listed). Thus, for example, the data in
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We see further evidence for this interpretation when we isolate deals involving U.S. patent assets assigned to PTO Tech Center 3600. TC 3600 specializes in examining “business method” applications and includes three work
units devoted to examining applications covering “electronic commerce.”118
As shown below in Table 16, we see a much steeper decline in prices for these
assets. While the overall average asking price for software patents fell about
twenty percent between 2012 and 2016, average per-asset asking prices for
business method patents dropped almost forty percent. In fact, during this
timeframe business method patents transitioned from among the most valuable
software patents on the market to among the least valuable.
Again, these findings are consistent with the market responding to available information about changes to the patent system. As several commentators
have concluded, the impact of Alice has in large measure been limited to “business method” patents and has not significantly impacted most other types of
“software” patents.119

the adjacent column is meant to communicate that four software packages listed in 2012
were subsequently purchased and asserted (before December 31, 2016). And, these
four software packages represent fifty-seven percent of the seven total packages listed
in 2012 that were subsequently purchased and asserted.
118. U.S. patent examiners are divided into nine “technology centers,” each subdivided into a number of “work units” that, in turn, are further subdivided into “art units.”
See Patent Technology Centers Management, supra note 44. Though titled “Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security and License
and Review,” Technology Center 3600 is the primary tech center for applications covering business methods. See TC 3600 Management Roster, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/tc-3600-management-roster (last
visited May 22, 2018); Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact
of a “Minor Case” (Part 2), BILSKIBLOG (June 20, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-casepart-2.html (reporting that applications examined by TC 3600 have been rejected on
patentable subject matter grounds more often than those examined by any other technology center). Within TC 3600, work units 3620, 3680, and 3690 specialize in business method patents related to “electronic commerce” and include art units devoted to
“Coupons,” “Electronic Shopping,” “Accounting,” and “Finance/Banking/Insurance.”
TC 3600 Management Roster, supra.
119. See Mark Summerfield, How the Fate of Software and Business Method Patents Has Turned on USPTO Directors and the Courts, PATENTOLOGY (Jan. 8, 2017,
3:53 PM), http://blog.patentology.com.au/2017/01/how-fate-of-software-and-business.html (comparing PTO data on applications examined in tech centers 3600 and
2100 and concluding that “in established fields of software technology . . . neither US
court decisions nor changes in management have resulted in any identifiable deviation
in US patent grant rates” despite the fact that “the US Supreme Court decision in Alice
looks to have eliminated about 75% of new business method patents”); Sachs, supra
note 118 (showing that patentable subject matter rejections are largely isolated to Tech
Center 3600).
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Table 16: Business Method Patent Sales by Year
2012
Num. Bus. Method
Packages (% of
Annual Total
Packages)
Observed
Avg. (Median)
Total
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median)
U.S.
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median)
Asking Price/Asset
Avg. (Median)
Asking Price/U.S.
Asset
Num. Bus. Method
Packages (% of
Annual Total
Packages) from
Listing Year that
Sold120
Avg. (Median)
Total
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median)
U.S.
Assets/Package
Avg. (Median) Est.
Sales Price/Asset
Sold
Avg. (Median) Est.
Sales Price/U.S.
Asset Sold

2013

2014

2015

2016

32
(16%)

73
(19%)

140
(21%)

102
(14%)

140
(21%)

19.4
(11)

27.6
(6)

23.6
(8)

20.4
(11)

27.3
(14)

11.3
(7.5)

18.6
(4)

18.7
(6)

14.6
(7)

17.5
(8)

$317
($288)

$236
($167)

$171
($121)

$174
($112)

$186
($138)

$389
($325)

$312
($245)

$254
($167)

$241
($167)

$247
($200)

16
(22%)

30
(23%)

47
(26%)

18
(15%)

7
(19%)

15.1
(5.5)

34.9
(11)

32.1
(10)

32.1
(24)

34.0
(15)

10.7
(5)

25.5
(7)

23.4 (8)

23.1
(19)

25.0
(11)

$240
($228)

$159
($120)

$109
($81)

$89
($81)

$134
($69)

$276
($219)

$185
($153)

$187
($163)

$118
($108)

$173
($99)

120. See supra note 72.
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V. ANALYSIS
Synthesizing the findings reported above, we draw three broad conclusions from our data regarding what the brokered market can tell us about how
to value patented technology, what operating companies can do to respond to
the patent “troll” problem, and what the market can tell us about the future of
the patent system.
First, our data strongly suggests that the brokered market for patents is
primarily, and perhaps almost exclusively, a market for the transfer of potential
legal liability, not a market for the transfer of technology. Over ninety-nine
percent of the packages that we observed were made up exclusively of patent
assets. None of these packages included copyrights, trademarks, or trade secrets, let alone other forms of technological knowhow like software, prototypes, or technical documentation. In addition, our findings suggest that buyers
tend to value just a few assets per package, particularly assets that are the subject of an EOU suggesting that they are infringed by a large, profitable tech
company. Moreover, a large percentage of patents that are sold (about fiftyseven percent of packages) winds up in the hands of PAEs and defensive aggregators, neither of which commercialize technology. And, finally, the overwhelming majority of patents offered and purchased on the brokered market
cover computing and telecommunications technologies, which generally can
be (and often are) transferred without significant patent protection.121
One important consequence of this conclusion is that prevailing prices in
the brokered market may be of limited use for purposes of calculating damages
in patent suits. While courts and commentators alike have called for the increased use of evidence derived from the market for “real world” patent transactions,122 we are not convinced that data from the brokered market is a panacea for concerns about damages calculations. If we are correct that prices in
the brokered market largely reflect buyers’ and sellers’ estimates of the litigation value of available assets, then brokered market data falls prey to the same
“circularity” concerns that a long list of commentators has raised against undue
reliance on prior license agreements.123 True technology transfer, it would appear, remains hidden from public view even more so than the brokered market
for “bare” patent transactions.
Yet another consequence of the market’s basis in liability, not technology,
is that the market itself represents another heretofore largely hidden source of

121. A 2008 survey of entrepreneurs found that only twenty-four percent of software startups owned patent assets and that “first-mover advantage,” not patent protection, was ranked the most “important” means to “capture competitive advantage” in the
software industry. Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1255, 1277, 1289–90 (2009).
122. The Supreme Court, for example, has referred to prior licenses of the patentin-suit as the “best measure of damages.” Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886).
123. See, e.g., Masur, supra note 6, at 122.
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indirect costs and benefits from patent monetization. While lawsuits and damages awards are publicly accessible, most patent assertions never make it to
court.124 The brokered market, thus, offers a window into the costs of potential
patent assertions that were nipped in the bud with a defensive acquisition. During the five years covered by our study, we estimate that operating companies
and defensive aggregators spent hundreds of millions of dollars purchasing patents for the primary purpose of reducing their exposure to patent assertion. At
the same time, our data also reveals that a large number of assets, worth billions
of dollars in the eyes of brokers and their clients,125 were never sold. While
defending a patent suit is undoubtedly expensive, bringing one is not cheap
either.126 To at least some extent, these unsold assets represent potential value
that cannot be realized due to the high transaction costs involved in transferring
patent rights. At the same time, then, they likewise represent potential risk to
operating companies that could reemerge if the costs or returns to enforcement
shift in the future.
Second, we find that operating companies, particularly large publicly
traded firms, are the most active sellers and buyers in the brokered market.
Perhaps most importantly, we see that operating companies are the source of
about sixty percent of packages acquired by PAEs. This observation suggests
to us that PAEs are, in significant part, a collective action problem among operating tech companies. While the tech industry on the whole decries patent
monetization as a net drag on innovation, in some situations tech companies
face strong financial incentives to sell their own assets to PAEs for assertion
against their competitors. Were operating companies better able to achieve and
enforce ex ante agreements not to sell to PAEs, it seems likely that the level of
PAE activity would significantly decline. Without access to a stream of assets
from large tech companies, fewer PAEs would be able to subsist on a diet of
patents sourced from individual inventors and failed startups. Thus, our data
may suggest that self-help solutions that facilitate the “mutual disarmament”
of patent assets among operating companies may be more promising than previously recognized. Existing initiatives, like the License on Transfer (“LOT”)

124. See Mark A. Lemley, Kent Richardson & Erik Oliver, The Patent Enforcement
Iceberg (Dec. 18, 2017) (working paper) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3087573) (reporting that, among respondents in a survey of technology companies, about two-thirds of patent licensing demands eventually resulted in
litigation).
125. The cumulative asking price for all unsold assets that we observed is approximately $4 billion.
126. According to the AIPLA’s most recent survey of its membership, the median
cost of litigating a patent suit with less than $1 million at stake through the end of
discovery is $250,000. AIPLA, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-118 (2017)
(on file with authors).
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Network127 and the Open Innovation Network (“OIN”),128 provide a useful
blueprint for ex ante coordination among operating companies.
Third, we find less market fluctuation over time than many might expect.
During the period covered by our study, the U.S. patent system saw a number
of major changes, some of which elicited near-apocalyptic predictions.129 Despite this, we saw no drastic swings in the market.130 While overall prices do
appear to have fallen significantly since 2012, software patents continue to sell
for substantial sums of money, and the market appears to have correctly assessed (before many commentators) that the impact of Alice would be largely
contained to business method patents. Though the data that we present is
purely descriptive, our observations suggest to us that the brokered market reflects a cool-headed assessment of the profitability of patent monetization (at
least when viewed in the aggregate) and, thus, has at least some promise for
use as a metric for predicting and gauging the impact of changes in law and
procedure.
However, we also acknowledge that our data is limited in a number of
respects and that our findings and conclusions should be considered with those
limitations in mind. As discussed above, our data does not cover all patent
transfers but only those that followed quasi-public solicitations made by patent
brokers. Moreover, while our study is the most comprehensive analysis of
which we are aware, we nonetheless fail to capture the entire brokered market,
and thus we cannot rule out the possibility that our observations are biased as
a result. In addition, our data on market prices is, by necessity, a work of approximation. Asking prices were often interpreted from general ranges provided by sellers and sometimes were not provided at all. Also, as discussed
127. See How LOT Works, LOTNETWORK, http://lotnet.com/how-lot-works/ (last
visited May 22, 2018) (“Upon becoming a member of LOT Network, when another
member sells or transfers a patent to a patent troll or PAE, you are automatically granted
immunity against PAE lawsuits for the life of that patent.”).
128. See About OIN, OPEN INNOVATION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/about-us/ (last visited May 22, 2018) (“The Open Invention Network is a
shared defensive patent pool with the mission to protect Linux.”).
129. See, e.g., Richard Baker, America Invents Act Cost the US Economy over $1
Trillion, PATENTLY-O (June 8, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/america-invents-trillion.html; Paul Morinville, How the U.S. Is Killing Innovation and Why It
Matters for Entrepreneurs, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/10/24/how-the-u-s-is-killing-innovation-and-why-it-matters-for-entrepreneurs/id=62679/.
130. Mark Lemley recently made a similar observation about the patent system as
a whole. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“Despite the undeniable significance of these changes in both directions, something curious has happened to the fundamental characteristics of the patent
ecosystem during this period: very little. Whether we look at the number of patent
applications filed, the number of patents issued, the number of lawsuits filed, the patentee win rate in those lawsuits, or the market for patent licenses, the data show very
little evidence that patent owners and challengers are behaving differently because of
changes in the law.”).
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above, the sales prices we report are approximations derived from a combination of the asking prices that we observed and a (smaller) benchmark analysis
of true sales prices. Thus, we likewise caution that our pricing-related statistics
are best viewed in the aggregate and, particularly for smaller populations, may
be significantly biased by individual packages offered at unrealistically high
prices. Finally, we note that our data suffers from truncation biases caused by
the “pipeline” of sales activity that we observed. Because packages listed in a
given year often sell the next year (or even later), the sale statistics that we
report are necessarily incomplete. In early years (particularly 2012) we were
unable to observe sales of patents that were listed before our data collection
began, particularly in 2011. Similarly, for many patents listed in recent years
(particularly 2016), it is not possible to observe their eventual sale.

VI. CONCLUSION
Despite these limitations, we believe our study to be the most in-depth
analysis performed to date of the secondary market for patents, and our data to
be the most comprehensive collection possible given the fractured and confidential nature of today’s market. Overall, our study includes data on almost
39,000 patent assets listed on the quasi-public “brokered” patent market between 2012 and 2016. Using this data, we provide statistics on the size and
composition of the brokered market, including the types of buyers and sellers
who participate in the market, the types of patents listed and sold on the market,
and how market conditions have changed over time.
Our findings suggest that the brokered market is a market allowing patent
owners to address potential legal liability and, thus, may not be well suited for
use in valuing technology. We also observe that PAEs play a sizeable role in
the market and most often acquire patents from operating technology companies. Thus, our findings suggest that a significant part of the brokered market
can be viewed as an extension of patent enforcement campaigns that, to date,
are largely observable only when they enter federal court. Our data also suggests that operating companies concerned about PAE activity may be well advised to invest more heavily in the creation of third party organizations that
facilitate mutual patent disarmament among groups of technology firms. Finally, though we do observe a significant decrease in patent sales prices over
the course of our study, the market (even for software patents) hardly cratered
in response to the introduction of administrative patent challenges in 2012 or
the Supreme Court’s 2014 opinion in Alice v. CLS Bank. To the contrary, the
market actually grew in 2016. The brokered market’s behavior during this tumultuous time in patent law suggests to us that it may well have utility in predicting the impact of future changes to patent law and procedure, at least as
they relate to shifts in the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants
in patent litigation.
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